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1. Introduction1
Credit market disruptions and economic uncertainty are commonly listed among the2
main causes of the prolonged recession experienced by the US and other western economies3
after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 (Stock and Watson, 2012). Financial mar-4
kets are known to be capable of generating shocks that are as powerful as those analyzed5
by the traditional real business cycle literature.1 Uncertainty or ‘risk’ shocks have also re-6
cently come to the fore in policy and research debates as an important source of economic7
cycles.2 There is a clear link between the two: since investors price risk, financial markets8
seize up when economic uncertainty is high. Indeed, while the role of uncertainty has been9
traditionally linked to real frictions (Bernanke 1993; Bloom 2009, 2014), recent research has10
placed financial frictions at the centre of the transmission mechanism arguing that credit11
markets are the crucial link in the propagation of uncertainty shocks (Arellano et al., 2012;12
Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014; Caldara et al., 2016). This paper examines a13
conjecture that follows naturally from the ‘financial view’ of the transmission mechanism.14
If uncertainty affects the real economy mainly through financial markets, its impact might15
vary significantly over the cycle under the influence of fluctuations in asset prices and balance16
sheet conditions. In particular, weak balance sheets and ‘thin’ financial markets could boost17
the transmission mechanism and leave the economy particularly vulnerable to an increase18
in uncertainty. To investigate this possibility we estimate a nonlinear VAR using monthly19
data covering the period between January 1973 and May 2014, and study how the response20
of the US economy to uncertainty shocks depends on aggregate financial conditions. The21
model has two distinguishing features. First, aggregate uncertainty is captured directly by22
the average volatility of the structural shocks, and it affects the dynamics of the economy23
1See e.g. Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Gilchrist and Zakraišek (2012)
among others.
2The research on uncertainty is reviewed below and in Section 2.; for the policy side of the debate, see
for instance FOMC (2008) and Blanchard (2009).
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through a volatility-in-mean type of mechanism (Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013; Mumtaz and1
Theodoridis, 2015, 2017; Mumtaz and Surico, 2018). Second, the dynamics can change2
when financial markets are dysfunctional: the model includes a financial distress indicator3
and it allows the parameters to shift when this crosses an endogenously-determined critical4
threshold. This combination of stochastic volatility and multiple regimes, which finds a nat-5
ural justification in this context, represents a methodological novelty that could be of wider6
interest to empirical macroeconomists.7
Our estimates show that the implications of an uncertainty shock differ significantly across8
financial regimes. In normal times uncertainty shocks are inflationary and have relatively9
little impact on output. When financial markets are in distress, on the contrary, they are10
deflationary, and their impact on output is roughly six times larger. The share of output11
variance explained by the shocks is modest in absolute terms, but twice as big in times of12
financial turmoil compared to calm periods (8% versus 4%). Once the nonlinearity is taken13
into account, the shocks appear to be responsible for about one percentage point of the14
peak fall in output observed in the Great Recession. These results provide new evidence15
on the pivotal role played by financial markets in propagating uncertainty shocks. They16
also point to an important complication to be taken into account when studying the role of17
uncertainty and financial conditions in driving macroeconomic fluctuations: the two are not18
easily separable, because uncertainty becomes more relevant if and when the economy has19
previously been hit by a sequence of adverse financial shocks. The Great Recession provides20
a powerful illustration of this issue.21
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in Sec-22
tion 2., in Section 3. we introduce the nonlinear VAR framework and discuss its relation with23
DSGE models featuring uncertainty shocks. Our main results are illustrated in Section 5..24
Section 6. examines the robustness of our conclusions to various data choices and modelling25
assumptions. Section 7. concludes.26
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2. Literature1
Uncertainty shocks are known to have powerful recessionary effects (see Bloom (2014) for2
a survey of the evidence). While the traditional view of the transmission mechanism relies3
on some form of irreversibility in the firms’ investment and hiring decisions (Bernanke, 1983;4
Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012), more recent studies place financial frictions at the centre5
of the transmission mechanism (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et6
al., 2014).3 When financial contracts are subject to agency or moral hazard problems, a rise7
in uncertainty increases the premium on external finance, leading to an increase in the cost8
of capital and a fall in firms’ investment. This ‘financial view’ of the transmission mecha-9
nism implies that asset prices and credit aggregates are crucial in propagating uncertainty10
shocks to the real economy. Consistent with this prediction, Gilchrist et al. (2014) find11
that uncertainty has a modest impact on output in a financially frictionless economy, while12
Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) show that uncertainty shocks are more powerful in13
countries with underdeveloped financial markets. This paper examines the ‘financial view’14
along a different dimension, testing whether the impact of uncertainty shocks in the US has15
changed over time in connection with the state of the financial cycle. Our work is motivated16
by the consideration that, although the underlying frictions are structural in nature, the17
liquidity of financial markets and the availability of external finance obviously depend on18
the state of both borrowers’ and lenders’ balance sheets, and this changes significantly over19
time under the influence of fluctuations in real and financial asset prices.420
The connection between uncertainty and financial conditions has been typically neglected21
in the VAR literature (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann et al., 2013; Carriero et al., 2015; Leduc22
and Liu, 2016; Mumtaz and Surico, 2018). We are aware of three exceptions to this rule.23
3The real/financial divide sketched here is of course a stark simplification of the views that have been
put forward on the topic: in Villaverde et al. (2011) uncertainty affects real aggregates because of a hedging
motive, while Basu and Bundick (2017) study the role of nominal frictions.
4The general role of financial markets as shock amplifiers is examined inter alia in Mendoza (2010),
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Hubrich and Tetlow (2015).
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Popescu and Smets (2010) and Benati (2013) note that the coexistence of credit spreads1
and uncertainty proxies in a VAR raises significant identification issues and suggest that2
uncertainty shocks play a minor role once financial shocks are taken into account. Caldara3
et al. (2016) document that allowing credit conditions to respond to changes in uncertainty is4
critical in order for these shocks to affect economic activity. We examine the same issues but5
resort to a nonlinear model to study the state-dependent link between financial conditions6
and uncertainty.7
The evidence regarding variation in the transmission of uncertainty shocks over time8
is relatively scant. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2012) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017)9
find that the impact of uncertainty on output in the US has decreased over the last five10
decades. Caggiano et al. (2014) estimate a Smooth-Transition VAR on post-war US data,11
finding that uncertainty had a stronger impact on unemployment during recessions. None12
of these papers models the interdependence between uncertainty and financial conditions13
highlighted by the ‘financial view’ of the transmission mechanism. A step in this direction14
is attempted by Lhuissier and Tripier (2016), who use a Markov-switching VAR and find15
that shocks to the VIX index are more powerful during periods that ex post appear to be16
associated to financial tensions. Two methodological choices set our work apart from theirs’:17
the measurement of uncertainty, which is more grounded in theory, and the nature of the18
regime-switching mechanism, which explicitly links the regimes to credit conditions. Both19
are discussed extensively in Section 3.2.. Although establishing why and how the impact20
of uncertainty shocks has changed over time is not trivial, our estimates indicate clearly21
that financial markets ‘matter’ and that credit constraints are a credible alternative to the22
explanations examined by Caggiano et al. (2014) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) (see23
Section 5.3.).24
Our econometric approach and our measure of uncertainty mark an important departure25
from the literature. Instead of relying on observable proxies such as realized equity price26
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volatility or the VIX index we measure uncertainty as the average volatility of the econ-1
omy’s structural shocks, which in our framework can be estimated directly from the data.2
Time-varying volatilities are a pervasive feature of macroeconomic data (see e.g. Justiniano3
and Primiceri, 2008). More importantly, conditional volatilities are directly related to the4
overall predictability of the economic environment, which is ultimately the key uncertainty5
factor in households’ and firms’ decisions.5 The idea of using a scalar volatility process in a6
multivariate model has been introduced by Carriero et al. (2016), while volatility-in-mean7
effects are studied in the context of otherwise linear VAR models by Mumtaz and Zanetti8
(2013), Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015, 2017), Mumtaz and Surico (2018). The combination9
of stochastic volatility and regime switches is a novelty of this paper.10
3. A VAR with financial regimes and volatility effects11
The next subsection introduces our nonlinear VAR model and describes estimation and12
calculation of the impulse-response functions. The following one relates the model to the13
theoretical literature on uncertainty, providing a more detailed discussion of our identification14
assumptions.15
3.1. Structure of the model16
Our starting point is a VAR model where the structural shocks have time-varying, sto-17
chastic volatilities which influence the first-moment dynamics of the system (Mumtaz and18
Zanetti, 2013; Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2015, 2017; Mumtaz and Surico, 2018). The frame-19
work is extended here in order to allow for these dynamics to be characterized by two distinct20
regimes, corresponding to periods of calm and tense financial markets. The model is defined21
as follows:22
5See also Jurado et al. (2015). We discuss these points further in Section 3., and provide a comparison
between our estimate of uncertainty and that by Jurado et al. (2015) in Section 5..



























Here  = {   } is a set of (at least) four endogenous variables: industrial pro-
duction growth, consumer price inflation, the three-month Treasury Bill rate and an indicator
of financial conditions, such as a corporate bond spread (the data is described in Section 4.).
Uncertainty is represented by : as we clarify below, this is treated as an unobservable state
variable and estimated exploiting the volatility of the shocks that occurred over the sample
period. By introducing ̃ we allow for the existence of two economic "regimes" characterized
by potentially different dynamics. In particular, the regime is determined in this application
by the level of the financial distress indicator relative to some unobserved threshold ∗:
̃ = 1⇐⇒ − ≤ ∗ (2)
where both the delay  and the threshold ∗ are unknown parameters. Equation (1)1
shows that, as in standard threshold models, all parameters are allowed to change across2












where 1 and 2 are lower triangular matrices. Finally, the volatility process is defined5
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as:1
 =  (4)
 = (1 2 3 4)
ln = +  ln−1 + 
where  is an i.i.d. innovation with variance . Following Carriero et al. (2016), we thus2
assume that a single, scalar volatility process  drives time variation of the entire variance-3
covariance matrix of the structural shocks. We take this process to represent economic4
uncertainty.6 Intuitively, a volatility or uncertainty shock   0 raises , causing an5
upward shift in the covariance matrix of the innovations , and hence a sudden deterioration6
of the accuracy with which agents can forecast +. By letting  enter equation (1), our7
framework allows output, asset prices and monetary policy to adjust endogenously to the8
new, riskier (and less predictable) state of the economy. The occurrence of regime shifts9
associated to periods of financial distress captures the time-varying nature of the underlying10
transmission mechanisms: the two sets of parameters {  Ω}=12 can be thought of11
as capturing the behavior of the economy in periods of "tense" and "calm" financial markets,12
or binding and non-binding borrowing constraints. No restrictions are placed on how the13
primitive shocks  and  play out in different regimes.
7
14
The Gibbs sampling algorithm for the estimation of the model in described in detail in the15
Appendix to the paper. The main intuition behind it is straightforward. Given a draw for16
, the model collapses to a threshold VAR, albeit with a known form of heteroscedasticity.17
6In our benchmark model we set  = 13 (a standard choice with monthly data) and  = 3 (meaning that
the state of the economy can be affected by the levels of uncertainty that prevailed over the past quarter).
Allowing for  = 18 does not change the results. The definition and timing of the volatility process  is
discussed further in Section 6..
7The model nests a linear VAR with volatility effects, a TAR without volatility effects and a fully linear
VAR, all of which provide useful benchmarks for our analysis (see Section 5.3.).
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After a GLS transformation of the model, the conditional posterior distributions of the1
regime dependent VAR parameters, the threshold and delay are identical to those of a2
standard threshold VAR (see Alessandri and Mumtaz, 2017). In particular, as described3
in Chen and Lee (1995), the conditional posterior of the delay parameter is a Multinomial4
distribution, while the threshold value can be drawn from its non-standard posterior via a5
Metropolis step. Then the data can be split into regime-specific observations, and the VAR6
autoregressive coefficients sampled from the normal distribution. Given the residuals of the7
VAR and , the conditional posterior for  is standard and described in several recent8
papers (e.g. Cogley and Sargent, 2005). The variances  can be drawn from the inverse9
Gamma distribution. Given these parameters, the model admits a non-linear state-space10
representation. The state-variable  is drawn using the independence Metropolis algorithm11
introduced in Jacquier et al. (1994) for stochastic volatility models.12
Once the posterior distribution of all parameters is available, “generalized” impulse-13
responses are obtained using Montecarlo integration as described in Koop et al. (1996). In14
practice the responses are calculated as differences between conditional expectations obtained15
by simulating the model under a shock scenario and under a baseline, no-shocks scenario.16
For a given regime ( = 0 1) and regime-specific history ( −1), the responses are defined as17
 =
¡






, whereΨ represents all the parameters and18
hyperparameters of the model,  is the horizon under consideration and  denotes the shock19
of interest (in our case, an increase in uncertainty). Two points are worth emphasizing. First,20
the switch among regimes is treated as endogenous in this calculation: the economy can freely21
transition from calm to crisis dynamics or viceversa over the simulation horizon, depending22
on the sign and size of the shock. In other words, the simulation takes into account the23
dynamics of both the endogenous variables  and the parameters Ψ. Second, even within a24
given initial regime , the responses depend on the specific history of the system prior to the25
shock ( −1). Intuitively, the economy may respond differently when the financial distress26
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indicator is at its historical minimum and when it is just below its critical threshold, even1
though both constitute instances of "normal times". We focus throughout on the average2
responses in each regime. The normal-time response (respectively, crisis response) is thus3
calculated as the average response to the shock of interest across all histories that belong4
into regime  = 1 (respectively,  = 0). By averaging over histories we aim to obtain the5
most representative picture of the dynamics associated to each regime. The online annex6
to the paper provides results obtained conditioning separately on all histories in our sample7
(see section F). We find that regime-specific averages deliver an accurate description of the8
overall behavior of the economy. For industrial production, for instance, the cumulative9
12-month response to a one standard deviation uncertainty shock varies between -0.2% and10
-0.4% in normal times and exceeds -1.2% in all distress episodes but two (the exceptions11
are the short-lived financial tensions of 1984 and 1987). Furthermore, the Great Recession12
responses are of the same order of magnitude as those observed in the early 1980s crisis13
(-1.9% versus -1.7%). In short, the variation within regimes is negligible compared to the14
variation across regimes.15
3.2. Theoretical background16
Like Jurado et al. (2015), we use a model-based measure of uncertainty that is directly17
linked to the agents’ (in)ability to form predictions on the fundamentals of the economy.18
This allows us to avoid using proxies that are at best weakly related to macroeconomic19
predictability, such as the VIX index. Relative to the factor model by Jurado et al. (2015),20
the volatility-in-mean specification employed in this paper has the advantage of modeling21
the economy’s first and second moments in a unified, internally-consistent framework. In our22
model agents form expectations + treating uncertainty as an ordinary state variable:23
they estimate , project it forward considering its persistence ( ), and take into account24
its influence on the economy ( 6= 0). These expectations are then integrated out in the25
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impulse-response analysis. Clearly this would not possible in a two-step procedure where1
uncertainty is first estimated using a forecasting model and then linked to macroeconomic2
fundamentals through a separate set of regressions. This improvement comes at the cost of3
a dimensionality problem, as our set up forces us to model a far smaller number of variables4
than Jurado et al. (2015). However, we find this cost to be quantitatively small (see Sections5
5.1. and 6.).6
The volatility-in-mean feature also takes our set up closer to the theoretical literature on7
uncertainty. In the model uncertainty (i) stems directly from the volatility of the structural8
shocks in the economy, (ii) follows an AR(1) process, and (iii) is exogenous to the first-9
moment dynamics of the economy. The model thus closely resembles the reduced-form of10
a DSGE model with stochastic volatility. There are two main differences between the two:11
first, the focus is on the average volatility of the shocks rather than the volatility of a specific12
structural shock; second, the threshold structure neglects some of the interactions that arise13
naturally in (high-order solutions to) a nonlinear DSGE model.8 To check whether these14
modelling choices introduce a bias in the impulse-responses we run a Montecarlo experiment15
using as data-generating process the model of Carriero et al. (2015). The model represents16
a simple new-keynesian economy where uncertainty is introduced via heteroscedastic inno-17
vations in the Taylor rule followed by the central bank. Model and simulation are described18
in more detail in the online annex to the paper (see section C). We simulate artificial data19
from a third-order approximation to the model and then estimate the vol-in-mean VAR on20
the simulated data. Conditioning on a volatility shock, the VAR generates responses that21
closely match those of the theoretical model: the theoretical IRFs lie within a one standard22
deviation confidence band of the VAR responses for all variables throughout a 5 year sim-23
ulation horizon. The responses are particularly accurate for aggregate output, which is our24
8The threshold structure captures the interaction between uncertainty  and financial conditions  (and
more generally all interactions of the form −1, where  is a shorthand for the shocks and predetermined
state variables in the model), but ignores the interactions that are unrelated to financial markets.
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main variable of interest.1
Identification is achieved in our model by assuming that  is not affected by lags of 2
and that first- and second-moment shocks are orthogonal, i.e. ()=0. This implies that3
uncertainty is exogenous to the level dynamics of the economy. This assumption is consistent4
with the dominant theoretical approach to modeling risk and uncertainty (see Section 2.)5
and it is supported by the empirical evidence in Carriero et al. (2017), which suggests that6
macroeconomic uncertainty does not respond to changes in cyclical conditions in the US.7
Exogeneity greatly simplifies the estimation of the impulse-responses. However, our results8
do not hinge on it. The robustness analysis of Section 6. considers a more general model9
where () is left unrestricted and identification is achieved through narrative sign re-10
strictions à la Ludvigson et al. (2017). Although the estimates are overall less accurate, this11
model confirms the conclusion that uncertainty shocks have a stronger impact on FCI and12
output in periods of financial distress. Finally, notice that the framework does not require13
the identification of the structural shocks that drive the level dynamics of the system. Since14
(i) we are not interested in level shocks per se, and (ii) we study changes in the average15
volatility of the economy, rather than the volatility of distinct structural shocks, we do not16
need to impose specific theory-based restrictions on the residual covariance matrices of the17
observation equation of the VAR. The recursive factorization of the matrices in equation (3)18
can play a role in our analysis too, but only insofar as it affects the estimation of the average19
volatility process  (Cogley and Sargent, 2005). This indirect influence turns out to be20
negligible. If we swap FCI and R, for instance, we obtain a ̂ that correlates at 92% with the21
baseline estimate and generates nearly identical IRFs. Under alternative orderings the cor-22
relation can drop to 50-60%, but the IRFs remain again qualitatively similar to the baseline,23
particularly in terms of asymmetries across financial regimes (the results are available upon24
request). This form of robustness is particularly valuable in this context because identifying25
uncertainty shocks from the first-moment dynamics of a VAR is notoriously problematic26
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(Caldara et al., 2016).1
4. Data2
The estimation employs monthly data covering the period from January 1973 to May3
2014. Industrial production index, consumer price index and the nominal three-month Trea-4
sury bill rate are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Database (FRED
R°
).5
The choice of the financial indicator is clearly important given the objective of the exercise,6
and it is not straightforward. On the one hand, the indicator should capture the dynamics7
of a large set of financial variables: uncertainty can affect firms’ funding through a number8
of markets at the same time; a broad indicator is likely to be more robust to structural insta-9
bilities affecting the link between financial and real economy (Stock and Watson, 2003); and10
controlling accurately for the state of financial markets is important to isolate uncertainty11
shocks in a credible way (Caldara et al., 2016). On the other hand, the indicator should12
not be too correlated with the business cycle. Since the analysis relies on our ability to13
isolate episodes of genuine financial distress in the data, a strong correlation between real14
and financial cycle would weaken our tests and make our null hypothesis indistinguishable15
from that examined by Caggiano et al. (2014). Insofar as broad indicators are more likely to16
be subject to endogeneity issues these two objectives are hard to reconcile. We circumvent17
the problem by using a range of alternative indicators. The first and broadest one is the18
Financial Condition Index (FCI), a real-time indicator of financial distress constructed and19
maintained by the Chicago Fed. The index is extracted using dynamic factor analysis from20
a set of 120 series that describe a broad range of money, debt and equity markets, as well as21
the leverage of the financial industry (Brave and Butters, 2012). To mitigate endogeneity,22
we also use a "purged FCI" obtained as the residual from a regression of FCI on the Chicago23
Fed National Activity Index. The third alternative is the Excess Bond Premium (EBP)24
constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), which represents the excess return required25
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by bond investors over and above their compensation for expected defaults. Finally, we also1
employ a simple, model-free measure of funding conditions, namely Moody’s spread between2
BAA corporate bonds and 10-year Treasury bill rates. Section 6. also examines versions of3
the baseline model that include observable proxies of aggregate uncertainty, such as the VIX4
index (see e.g. Bloom, 2009) and the government debt-to-GDP ratio (Mumtaz and Surico,5
2018).96
5. Results7
Our findings are organized in three subsections. The first one demonstrates that uncer-8
tainty shocks have a much larger impact on economic activity when credit conditions are9
tight. The second one shows that credit frictions also generate a sign asymmetry (uncer-10
tainty matters more on the way up than on the way down) and quantifies the contribution11
of uncertainty shocks to the US business cycle. The third and final one shows that financial12
regimes fit the data better than alternative views of the time-varying role of uncertainty that13
have been proposed in the literature.14
5.1. A financial accelerator for uncertainty shocks15
The periodization estimated by the Threshold VAR model is illustrated in Figure 1,16
which shows the Financial Condition Index and the associated financial regimes. Gray17
bands identify periods when the FCI is above the estimated critical threshold ∗, implying18
that the US economy is experiencing financial distress (see equation (2)). We refer to this19
as the ‘crisis’ regime. The delay parameter () has a median estimate of one month, with20
a 95% upper bound of two months only: this suggests that the economy tends to enter the21
crisis regime immediately once the threshold is breached. Figure 2 reproduces the estimated22
average volatility ̂ together with the measure of economic uncertainty calculated by Jurado23
9Mumtaz and Surico (2018) show that debt sustainability concerns represent a key component of policy
uncertainty in the US. We interpolate the authors’ quarterly debt-to-GDP series to a monthly frequency.
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et al. (2015). Both indicators suggest that economic uncertainty was highest in the USA in1
the early 1980s and in 2007-2009. The correlation between the two series is generally very2
strong, confirming that the two approaches rely on similar assumptions for the measurement3
of uncertainty (see Section 3.). This similarity also suggests that the volatilities of the4
(relatively small) set of variables included in the model provide a credible description of5
aggregate economic uncertainty, which Jurado et al. (2015) estimate using a much larger6
dataset (see also Section 6.). Taken together, figures 1 and 2 clearly confirm the stylized7
fact that high volatility, financial tensions and low growth are often associated in the recent8
history of the USA. Figure 3 plots the response of the US economy to an exogenous increase in9
uncertainty, defined as a positive one standard deviation shock to the  process in equation10
(4). The responses associated to good and bad financial times, namely to periods of low11
and high FCI, are pictured respectively in black and in red. For each regime the figure12
reports the median generalized impulse-responses and the associated 68% confidence bands13
(see Section 3.1. and Koop et al. (1996) for details). Notice that the volatility dynamics,14
shown in the last panel on the right, are identical across regimes because the stochastic15
volatility process  is not regime-dependent. In both regimes an increase in uncertainty leads16
to a financial tightening (panel 4) and a contraction in output (panel 1). The responses,17
however, are much more pronounced in the crisis regime: the contraction is more abrupt18
and the peak fall in output is roughly six times larger (—0.17% versus —0.02%). The key19
prediction of the ‘financial view’ of the transmission mechanism is thus supported by the20
data: uncertainty shocks are relatively inconsequential in normal times but their impact21
on credit markets and economic activity is greatly amplified during episodes of financial22
distress, when borrowing constraints bind more severely.10 Panel 2 shows that the response23
of inflation also changes dramatically across regimes: prices increase in normal times and24
10We find no evidence of the ‘overshooting’ in economic activity documented in Bloom (2009). Such
overshooting can be an artifact of using filtered data (Jurado et al., 2015). Since it is a specific trademark
of real as opposed to financial frictions, it may also vary across estimation samples owing to changes in the
relative importance of these factors — see the discussion in Bloom (2009) and Gilchrist et al. (2014).
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fall in a crisis.11 The literature offers mixed evidence on the relation between uncertainty1
and inflation. Uncertainty shocks are deflationary for instance in Basu and Bundick (2017),2
Christiano et al. (2014), and Leduc and Liu (2014), where they act as aggregate demand3
shocks, but they are inflationary in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015) and Mumtaz and4
Theodoridis (2015), where uncertainty on future demand and marginal costs introduces a5
precautionary upward bias in the firms’ pricing decisions. Our result suggests that this6
precautionary mechanism prevails in good times but is dominated by the standard channel7
in bad times, when aggregate demand is more sensitive to uncertainty because of binding8
borrowing constraints. Finally, notice that, although the short-term interest rate does not9
respond significantly to the shock (panel 3), its qualitative behavior can be easily rationalized10
in the light of this discussion. In a crisis both output and prices fall, so monetary policy can11
work countercyclically and interest rates tend to drop (the distribution of the responses lies12
mostly below the zero line). In normal times instead the shock generates stagflation and the13
responses are symmetrically distributed around zero. Truncating the sample to December14
2008, so to exclude the ‘zero lower bound’ period, does not affect any of these results.15
We next replicate the analysis using three alternative indicators to identify financial16
regimes in US history: a "purged" FCI obtained as the residual from a regression of FCI17
on economic activity, the Excess Bond Premium by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), and the18
spread between Moody’s BAA corporate bond yield and the 10-year T-Bill rate (see Section19
4.).12 The results are summarized in Figure 4. This is similar to Figure 3, except that the20
regimes are displayed on two separate rows and financial variables are omitted to improve21
clarity. To further facilitate the comparison across models we simulate in all cases an increase22
in volatility of approximately 0.5 units, which corresponds to one standard deviation in the23
11Inflation responds contemporaneously to the shock. An alternative specification where this effect is
excluded by assuming that only lags of  enter equation (1) produces analogous results (see Section 6.).
12In each of these specifications (i) both FCI and the alternative indicator are included in the  vector,
and (ii) the alternative indicator is used to estimate the threshold ∗ in equation (2). Hence, the information
sets are very similar across models. What changes is the mechanism that determines the endogenous switches
across regimes.
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benchmark model. As column 4 shows, the dynamics of the volatility process  are very1
similar across models. All specifications produce output and inflation responses that are2
in line with those of the benchmark model. The fall in industrial production (column 1)3
is larger in the crisis regime irrespective of which indicator is used to identify the regimes.4
In absolute terms, purged FCI and EBP generate smaller crisis-times responses than FCI,5
suggesting that some of the amplification effects in our baseline analysis might be associated6
to recessions rather than financial tensions. However, the asymmetry between good and bad7
times is clear and sizable for these indicators too. In the EBP-based model, for instance, the8
trough in output is approximately five times larger in the bad regime. The sign asymmetry9
in the inflation response (column 2) is equally robust: in all models consumer prices rise in10
good times (row 1) and fall marginally in bad times (row 2).13 The TAR models assume11
that the transitions across financial regimes are abrupt, which is broadly consistent with the12
onset of the periods of financial distress in our sample. The results do not change if we use a13
‘smooth’ transition mechanism, modeling the regimes through a logistic function that allows14
for gradual changes in credit conditions. The estimated regimes turn out to be very similar15
to those obtained from the benchmark TAR model and the responses of output and inflation16
are again strongly asymmetric (see section D of the online annex for details).17
5.2. Large shocks and the Great Recession18
Given the nonlinear nature of the model, the implications of a change in uncertainty19
might in principle also depend on sign and size of the shock. Figure 5 compares the response20
of industrial production to (i) ‘small’ and ‘large’ perturbations, defined respectively as one21
and five standard deviation shocks, and (ii) positive and negative perturbations, i.e. rises and22
falls in the volatility of the US economy.14 All responses are obtained from the benchmark23
13Part D of the online annex reports the regime estimates for the alternative TAR specifications. Relative
to the FCI, both EBP and the BAA spread tend to downweigth the financial tightening of the early 1980s,
emphasizing instead the 2001-2002 period.
14A full set of responses to five standard deviation shocks is provided in the online annex to the paper.
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specification of the TAR model that includes the FCI. The left column shows that normal-1
time responses are essentially linear in the sign and size of the shock. Furthermore, the2
comparison between left and right column reveals that financial crises amplify the shock3
irrespective of its size and direction. In the crisis regime, however, large shocks give place to4
an interesting sign asymmetry: a drop in volatility causes a smaller change in output than a5
rise in volatility of equal size (see bottom right panel). A similar form of asymmetry between6
positive and negative uncertainty shocks is documented by Foerster (2014). According to7
the model this asymmetry is the product of two factors: the strong impact that volatility8
has on financial markets, and the state-contingent nature of the linkage between financial9
markets and the real economy. In bad times, an increase in volatility keeps the economy10
in a state where financial markets are tight and the ‘volatility multiplier’ is large. A fall in11
volatility, on the other hand, generates a relaxation in financial conditions that can push the12
economy back into the good regime, where borrowing constraints bind less and the ‘volatility13
multiplier’ is lower. The upshot is that volatility matters more on the way up than on the14
way down.15
To quantify the overall role of uncertainty in the business cycle we resort to a forecast16
error variance (FEV) decomposition. Figure 6 shows the contribution of volatility shocks17
to the FEVs of all endogenous variables in the benchmark specification. The shocks are a18
powerful driver of financial conditions in both regimes (column 4). For output and inflation,19
not surprisingly, they are more relevant in bad times (columns 2 and 3). The fraction20
of output variance accounted for by volatility shocks is twice as big in the crisis regime,21
approximately 8% versus 4%. These estimates are broadly consistent with those of Caldara22
et al. (2016), who find that uncertainty accounts for about 10% of the FEV for industrial23
production and employment. They are instead far smaller than those reported by Caggiano24
et al. (2014), according to whom uncertainty explains 23% of the FEV of US unemployment25
in a linear VAR and as much as 62% of it in a smooth-transition VAR conditioning on26
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recessions. Although this discrepancy might partly depend on data and sampling issues,1
the nexus between uncertainty and financial markets is likely to be one of its causes. Since2
uncertainty and credit conditions co-move very strongly, the baseline model of Caggiano3
et al. (2014), which does not include financial variables, might mix credit and uncertainty4
shocks and thus overestimate the economic relevance of the latter.155
We conclude this section with a counterfactual exercise that provides a model-based6
narrative on the historical role of uncertainty shocks in the US. The counterfactual world7
we consider is one where uncertainty shocks do not occur (i.e.  = 0 in equation (4)), so8
the volatilities of all level shocks in the economy are constant at their sample means. This9
"constant uncertainty" world is simulated using both the baseline Threshold VAR and an10
otherwise identical VAR without threshold effects. For each model we first simulate the data11
under the counterfactual and then calculate the difference between actual and simulated12
series. This difference is a direct gauge of the role played by uncertainty shocks in the two13
frameworks; or, equivalently, of the loss of fit caused in each model by the counterfactual14
assumption that volatility remained constant over time. The results are illustrated in Figure15
7. The Threshold VAR (Threshold) and the volatility-in-mean VARwithout threshold effects16
(No Threshold) are represented respectively by red and black lines. The top left panel reports17
the results for Industrial Production. The negative values observed in the early 1980s and18
between 2007 and 2009 indicate that in both models shutting down volatility shocks causes19
an underestimation of the observed drop in output. However, this effect is much larger in20
the threshold model: in the Great Recession period, the gap amounts to only 0.2% for the21
VAR and over 1% for the TAR. The bottom left panel focuses on financial market dynamics.22
Without volatility shocks, the TAR entirely misses the spikes in FCI that occurred in the23
early 1980s and in 2008. The results are qualitatively similar for the VAR (FCI is again too24
15Caggiano et al. (2014) find indeed that the impact of uncertainty on employment is halved if the S&P500
index is included in the model. None of the specifications examined by the authors includes however corporate
credit spreads, which are a key ingredient in Caldara et al. (2014), Gilchrist et al. (2014) and in this paper.
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low in those periods), but the discrepancies are far less significant from a quantitative point1
of view. In short, ignoring financial thresholds leads to a partial and heavily downward-2
biased picture of the contribution of uncertainty shocks to financial and real cycles in the3
USA.4
5.3. Is it really about financial markets?5
Caggiano et al. (2014) find that the impact of uncertainty on economic activity in6
post-war US history has been higher in periods of low growth and high unemployment.7
According to Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017), uncertainty shocks have generally become8
less powerful over the last decades, possibly under the influence of a flatter Phillips curve and9
a more aggressive monetary policy stance. This raises a question: why does the transmission10
of uncertainty change over time, and how does the ‘financial view’ hold up against these11
alternative explanations? This issue is investigated below by comparing the Threshold VAR12
to a range of alternative time-varying models of the transmission mechanism. The model13
comparison is based on the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al.14
(2002). DIC is calculated using the mean likelihood of a model and a penalty correction that15
penalizes the model’s complexity, measured by the number of effective parameters. As such,16
it is particularly suited to situations where the models under scrutiny are highly nonlinear,17
or differ significantly in terms of complexity, as in this case. To assess the overall importance18
of the nonlinearities in the data, we first compare the benchmark TAR model used in the19
previous section (Benchmark) to three simpler specifications. In the first one we retain20
the double-regime structure but rule out a direct impact of uncertainty on the endogenous21
variables by setting  = 0 in equation 1 (No Uncertainty). This restriction delivers a model22
that accounts for the nonlinearities stemming from credit or collateral constraints but does23
not assign any role to uncertainty. In the second one, symmetrically, we allow for uncertainty24
effects but remove the threshold structure, obtaining a volatility-in-mean VAR à la Mumtaz25
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and Theodoridis (2015) (No Threshold) . In the third experiment we combine these two1
restrictions obtaining a linear VAR without uncertainty (No Threshold & No Uncertainty).2
We then consider two alternative ways of modelling the nonlinearity. The first one (IP-based3
Threshold) is a version of the benchmark TAR where the regimes are identified using annual4
growth in industrial production instead rather than financial conditions (i.e. we replace5
 with ∆
12 in equation 2). This mimics the model of Caggiano et al. (2014), where6
the regimes are linked to the state of the business cycle. The second alternative (TVP7
VAR) is a VAR where all parameters are treated as random walks, reproducing the smooth8
structural change modeled by Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017). The results are reported in9
Table 1. The restrictions that shut down the uncertainty channel (No Uncertainty), remove10
the differences across regimes (No Threshold) or turn the model into a linear VAR (No11
Threshold & No Uncertainty) all lead to a significant increase — i.e. a worsening — of the12
DIC relative to the benchmark model. This corroborates the empirical relevance of both13
volatility shocks and financial regimes in the data. Furthermore, Benchmark has a lower14
DIC than IP-based Threshold. This means that, in our sample, breaks associated to periods15
of financial distress capture structural change relatively better than a boom-recession type16
of periodization. Finally, Benchmark also dominates TVP VAR: financial regimes thus fit17
the data better than smoothly-changing parameters. In fact, TVP VAR turns out to have18
the highest DIC of all models included in Table 1, which suggests that its high complexity19
pays off relatively poorly in terms of explaining the patterns in the data.1620
Discriminating between financial thresholds, real thresholds and smooth, persistent forms21
of structural change is intrinsically difficult. Since financial conditions are strongly counter-22
cyclical, recessions and episodes of financial distress tend to overlap, blurring the line between23
‘financial’ and ‘real’ cycles. Furthermore, financial conditions improved steadily during the24
16The TVP VAR includes 6 lags instead of 13: the estimation of random-walk parameters becomes un-
feasible when the dimensionality of the model grows too large. However, we find that a benchmark TAR
restricted to 6 lags has again a far lower DIC than the TVP VAR with 6 lags (-5,761.7 versus -4,906.1). The
better performance of the TAR is thus unrelated to the number of lags.
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Great Moderation period (see e.g. Figure 1): this implies that the time-varying parameter1
VAR of Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) might also partly pick up a weaker transmission of2
uncertainty shocks through financial markets. A clean separation between these possibilities3
would thus require an encompassing structural model. From a purely statistical stand-4
point, however, the finance-driven interpretation of the amplification mechanism receives5
more support from the data. Furthermore, financial frictions and occasionally binding credit6
constraints are now widely recognized as a quantitatively important amplification mecha-7
nism for standard business cycle shocks (see e.g. Hubrich and Tetlow, 2015). Our analysis8
demonstrates that this mechanism also applies to volatility shocks.9
6. Sensitivity analysis10
The conclusions reached in the previous section are robust to various changes in the11
specification of the benchmark model. In particular, the results survive the inclusion of12
additional variables or estimated factors to the system, changes in the timing assumptions13
and/or definition of the volatility process, and the use of narrative sign restrictions à la14
Ludvigson et al. (2017) for the identification of uncertainty shocks. These exercises are de-15
scribed in turn below. The results are summarized in Figure 8. For each of the specifications16
introduced in this section the figure reports the responses of output and inflation to a one17
standard deviation increase in uncertainty (columns 1 and 2 respectively) and the estimated18
uncertainty series (column 3).19
6.1. Expanding the information set20
The benchmark model relies on an information set that is very rich on the financial side,
due to the presence of the Financial Conditions Index, but is relatively weak on the real
side, due to the small number of variables, and does not include any observable proxy of
aggregate uncertainty. As a first robustness check we thus replicate the benchmark analysis
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adding to the vector of observables  either the VIX index or the debt-to-GDP ratio, an
indicator of fiscal uncertainty (Mumtaz and Surico, 2018). The results are reported in rows
1 and 2 of Figure 8. Neither of these extensions alters our key results. In particular, the
responses of output and inflation to a rise in uncertainty still display a strong asymmetry
across financial regimes. The results are also unaffected if economic activity is measured by
the unemployment rate instead of industrial production (details are available upon request).
We then go a step further and replace the benchmark model with a Factor-Augmented TAR.
The introduction of a factor structure allows us to expand the information set in a far more
significant way, correcting for any missing variable bias and accounting for the possibility of
non-fundamentalness of shocks (Forni and Gambetti, 2014). The extended model is defined




































In the observation equation (5)  is a panel of 111 macroeconomic variables taken2
from Stock and Watson (2004) that incorporate information about real activity, inflation3
and the yield curve and include variables such as production and employment in various4
sectors, consumer prices, producer and commodity prices and government bond yields (a5
full list is available on request). ̃ = {̃1 ̃2 ̃} are a set of  unobserved factors that6
summarize the information in  and  denote the associated factor loadings. The model7
treats the financial conditions index  as an observed factor. The transition equation of8
the model is a TVAR in ̃ = {̃1 ̃2 ̃ } with stochastic volatility in mean as in the9
benchmark model above. The dynamics of  are described in equation 4. In summary, this10
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extended model incorporates additional information through the factors ̃ while retaining1
the threshold dynamics and stochastic volatility of the benchmark model.17 We fix  = 32
and use the same lag specification as in the benchmark case. This value for  ensures that3
the number of regime-specific parameters to be estimated in the transition equation remains4
feasible given the number of observations in each regime. The results from this model5
are reported in row 3 of Figure 8.18 As in the benchmark model, industrial production falls6
significantly more during crises, while the response of inflation is negative in the crisis regime7
and mildly positive in normal times. The volatility estimate obtained from this model (panel8
3) is very similar to the benchmark estimate.9
6.2. Volatility: measurement, timing and exogeneity.10
The benchmark model assumes that (i) aggregate uncertainty is captured by the average11
volatility of the shocks in the economy; (ii) uncertainty shocks can have a contemporane-12
ous impact on the economy; (iii) uncertainty shocks are orthogonal to the level shocks in13
the economy. We probe these assumptions sequentially below. Row 4 of Figure 8 reports14
estimates obtained from a version of the model where the contemporaneous impact of 15
on industrial production and inflation is restricted to be zero, while still allowing financial16
variables to be affected contemporaneously. Row 5 is based on an even stronger restriction17
that forces all variables in the system to respond to uncertainty with a one-month lag. In-18
tuitively, this extreme case mimics a recursive VAR where uncertainty is ordered last rather19
than first. Except for the time-zero responses, in both cases the dynamics of output and20
inflation match those generated by the benchmark model very closely.21
Modelling aggregate uncertainty as the average volatility of the shocks hitting the US22
economy is intuitive and computationally convenient (see Section 3.2.). In principle, however,23
17Details on the estimation of the Factor-Augmented TAR are available upon request.
18The variables in  are standardised and the impulse responses are converted back to percentages.
However, because of the initial standardisation, the scale of  can be different from the original model.
In Figure 8 we rescale the responses to match the average difference in the scale of  estimated using the
FAVAR and the benchmark model.
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one could also think of uncertainty as the common factor behind changes in the shock1
covariance matrix. To study this possibility we estimate a version of the model where2
variation in the error covariance matrix is driven by = (), where ln =  ln+3
ln . The factor loadings are denoted by , the common factor ln follows the transition4
equation defined in equation (4), and  is assumed to be white noise. In this set up the5
log-volatility of each shock  is decomposed into a common and an idiosyncratic component6
and, unlike in the baseline specification,  is estimated (i) stripping out all idiosyncratic7
components and (ii) allowing for shock-specific loadings .
19 The impulse-responses from8
this model are reported in row 6 of Figure 8. The responses are very similar to the benchmark9
case, with the crisis regime generating a much larger contraction in industrial production and10
a significant drop in inflation. As the the last panel shows, the common volatility component11
turns out to be highly correlated with the average volatility estimated by the benchmark12
model.13
Another assumption we borrow from the DSGE literature is that uncertainty is exoge-14
nous, so that ()=0 for all variables =1,..., included in the measurement equation of15
the VAR. Relaxing this assumption requires a more marked departure from the benchmark16
model. The online appendix to the paper discusses the estimation of a generalized model17
that allows for unrestricted, regime-dependent covariances across residuals (see section H).18
In essence, the structure defined by equations (1), (2) and (4) remains unchanged, but the19












where =1,2 denotes the two financial regimes and Σ parameterizes the covariance be-21
tween level and volatility shocks in regime . The distinguishing feature of this setup is that22
19While this model can be easily estimated using a slight modification of the MCMC algorithm described in
the appendix, we found (for our dataset) that identifying the unobserved components in the shock volatility
requires tight priors on the dynamics and scale of ln and ln .
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first- and second-moment shocks are correlated and uncertainty can respond endogenously1
to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. It follows that uncertainty shocks cannot be2
distinguished from level shocks without further assumptions. To that end, we use narrative3
sign restrictions in the spirit of Ludvigson et al. (2017). We assume that uncertainty shocks4
(i) raise volatility, (ii) have a (weakly) negative impact on output, and (iii) are negatively5
correlated to unexpected changes in the US stock price index. We further assume that (iv)6
large uncertainty shocks (two standard deviations or above) took place in October 1987 and7
at least once during the Great Recession.20 The responses are depicted in the last row of8
Figure 8. The confidence bands are generally wider in this case, owing to the increase in the9
complexity of the model and the switch to set identification. However, the crisis regime is10
again associated to a larger drop in output and a flip in the sign of the inflation response.11
After 12 months, the cumulative drop in output is approximately 0.2% in normal times and12
0.5% in bad times, and the fall in inflation in bad times is 0.5% (see section H of the annex13
for details).14
7. Conclusions15
Financial frictions are known to play an important role in the transmission of uncertainty16
shocks. This paper documents a new aspect of the interaction between the two by showing17
that an exogenous increase in economic uncertainty can have radically different macroeco-18
nomic implications depending on the conditions that prevail in financial markets when the19
shock materializes. Using monthly US data covering the period from January 1973 to May20
2014, we estimate a nonlinear VAR where uncertainty is captured by the average volatility21
of the economy’s structural shocks, and a regime change occurs whenever financial markets22
are in distress. The regime associated to high financial distress identifies periods in US his-23
tory where financial constraints were relatively more severe because balance sheets in the24
20The restrictions are based on Ludvigson et al. (2017). Both restriction and estimation method are
illustrated in detail in section H of the annex.
Financial regimes and uncertainty shocks. 27
private sector were strained, such as the early 1980s and 2008-2009. The estimates show1
that, although exogenous increases in uncertainty have recessionary effects at all times, their2
impact on output is roughly six times larger during a ‘financial crisis’. Accounting for this3
nonlinearity, uncertainty shocks explain one percentage point of the peak fall in industrial4
production observed in the Great Recession. These results provide further support for the5
financial view of the transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks (Christiano et al., 2014;6
Gilchrist et al., 2014). They also point to a complication that must be taken into account7
when examining the role of uncertainty and credit conditions in the business cycle: the two8
are not easily separable, because uncertainty becomes more relevant if and when the econ-9
omy has previously been hit by adverse financial shocks. Finally, the results suggest that,10
although uncertainty shocks can cause significant macro-financial fluctuations, policy mak-11
ers could limit their propagation by preserving the resilience of the financial sector through12
appropriate macroprudential policy interventions.13
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 
Benchmark -5,700.4
i. No Uncertainty -5,680.2
ii. No Threshold -5,687.5
iii. No Threshold & No Uncertainty -5,669.7
iv. IP-based Threshold -5,291.5
v. TVP VAR -4,906.1
1
Table 1: Deviance Information Criterion. The table reports the Deviance Infor-2
mation Criterion of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) for seven alternative models. Benchmark3
is the TAR described in Section 3.. Model (i) assumes that uncertainty has no impact on4
the economy. Model (ii) assumes a single regime. Model (iii) combines the two restrictions.5
Model (iv) is a TAR with the same structure as the benchmark, except that the switches6
between regimes are driven by annual growth in industrial production rather than the Fi-7
nancial Condition Index. Model (v) is a Time-Varying Parameter VAR where uncertainty8
has a direct impact on the endogenous variables, as in the benchmark, and all parameters9
are treated as random walks. All models are estimated using monthly data on industrial10
production, consumer price inflation, the three-month Treasury Bill rate and the Financial11
Condition Index between January 1973 and May 2014.12
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Figure 1: Financial regimes. FCI is the Chicago Fed Financial Condition Index. Gray bands
identify the subperiods when the US economy is estimated to be in a ‘financial crisis’, defined
as a state where the index exceeds the critical threshold in the TAR model of Section 3..
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Figure 2: Financial regimes and economic uncertainty. Gray bands denote the financial crises
indentified by the TAR model discussed in Section 3.. The black line is the uncertainty
estimate of Jurado et al. (2015). The red line is uncertainty measured as the average
volatility of the structural shocks in the US economy according to the TAR model (median
estimate and 68% confidence band).
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Figure 3: Impact of volatility shocks in good and bad times. The black lines show the impact
of a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of the US economy in normal times.
The red line shows the impact of the same shock during episodes of financial distress, defined
as periods when the Financial Condition Index (FCI) exceeds an endogenously-determined
critical threshold (see equation (2) in Section 3.). From left to right, the variables are
industrial production (IP), consumer price inflation (CPI), the nominal 3-month Treasury
Bill rate (R), FCI and the model-based volatility estimate. For each variable and regime the
figure reports the median response and a 68% confidence band.The horizontal axis is time,
measured in months. The estimation period is January 1973 — May 2014.
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Figure 4: Impact of volatility shocks under alternative financial conditions indicators. The
figure shows the response of industrial production growth, consumer price inflation and 3-
month T-Bill rate (columns 1 to 3) to a one standard deviation increase in the average
volatility of the US economy (column 4). The estimates are based on a Threshold-VAR
model that separates normal times (row 1) from financial crises (row 2). These are identified
as periods when one of four alternative financial distress indicators exceeds an endogenously-
determined critical threshold. FCI is the baseline Chicago Fed Financial Condition Index
used in figure 3 (median responses and 68% confidence bands). Purged FCI is the residual
from a regression of FCI on the Chicago Fed National Activity Index. BAA spread is the
spread between BAA corporate bonds and the 10 year T-Bill rate. EBP is the Excess Bond
Premium of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). All models are estimated over the period from
January 1973 to May 2014.
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Figure 5: Sign asymmetries. The first row shows the response of US industrial production
to a one standard deviation volatility shock in normal times (left colum) and in financial
crises (right column). Green and red shades represent the 68% confidence bands associated
respectively to decreases and increases in volatility. The second row shows the response
of industrial production to a five standard deviation volatility shock, distinguishing again
between normal and crisis times and between positive and negative shocks. All estimates
are obtained with the Threshold VAR of Section 3.1., estimated using data from January
1973 to May 2014. The horizontal axis is time, measured in months.
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Figure 6: Forecast error variance decomposition. Each panel shows the fraction of forecast
error variance explained by volatility shocks for one of the variables included in the Threshold
VAR of section 3.. The first row corresponds to calm periods and the second row corresponds
to financial crises, defined as periods when the financial distress indicator FCI exceeds an
endogenously-determined critical threshold (see equation (2)). The horizontal axis is the
forecast horizon measured in months.
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Figure 7: A counterfactual without uncertainty shocks. For each variable, the figure shows
the difference between actual data and model-generated series under the assumption of no
volatility shocks ( = 0 in equation (4)). The black lines are based on a linear VAR. The red
lines and the associated 68% confidence bands are based on a Threshold VAR that separates
periods of calm and distressed financial conditions.
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Figure 8: Robustness analysis. Each row refers to an alternative specification of the benchmark
TAR model studied in Section 5.1.. For each specification the figure shows the estimated average
volatility series (column 3) and the responses of industrial production and inflation to a one-
standard-deviation volatility shock (columns 1 and 2). Good time and bad time responses are
represented by black and cyan lines. Starting from the top row, the models are: a TAR model
that includes the VIX index or the public debt-to-GDP ratio (rows 1, 2); a Factor-Augmented
TAR (row 3); a TAR where volatility has no contemporaneous impact on industrial production and
inflation (row 4) or on any of the variables included in the model (row 5); a TAR where uncertainty
is captured by the common factor of the volatilities of the structural shocks (row 6); a TAR where
uncertainty shocks are identified using narrative sign restrictions (row 7). See section 6. for details.
